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TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS
The following abbreviations are sometimes hereinafter
used:
1. American —
and Loan Association.

Defendant/Respondent American Savings

2.

Dakal —

Plaintiff/Appellant Dakalf Inc.

3.

Diversified —

4.

Peck —

5.

Pentelute —

6.

Liston —

7.

Rydalch —

Mr. Wayne Peck.
Mr. Brad Pentelute.

Defendant Mark Engar Liston.
Defendant Douglas F. Rydalch.

8. Rydalches —
wife, Joan Rydalch.
9.

Plaintiff/Appellant Dakal, Inc.

Defendants Douglas F. Rydalch and his

U.C.A. (1953, as amended) —

Utah Code Annotated

10. F/F
refers to the numbered paragraph of the Findings of Fact portion of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law rendered by the trial court.
11. Tr
, L
refers to the page and line of the
Reporter's Transcript of Hearing held before the Honorable J.
Dennis Frederick on April 19, 1984.
12. TC
refers to the page of the Memorandum Decision rendered by the trial court on May 30, 1984.
13.

OR

refers to the page of the Official Record.

14. Ex.
refers to the respective exhibit received
into evidence at the hearing held before the Honorable J.
Dennis Frederick on April 19f 1984. Unless otherwise stated,
any reference to "Defendant's Ex.w refers to an exhibit
offered by Defendant American Savings and Loan Association.
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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This case is before the Court on a Writ of Certiorari
to the Utah Court of Appeals.

Jurisdiction to review the

Court of Appeals' decision in this matter is conferred upon
the Utah Supreme Court by Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(3)(a)
and (5)f and by Rule 42 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme
Court as follows:
U.C.A. 78-2-2. (3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction/ including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals/ over:
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals.
U.C.A. 78-2-2.
(5) The Supreme Court has sole
discretion in granting or denying a petition for
writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of
Appeals adjudication/ ...
RULE 42. R. Utah S. Ct.
Unless otherwise provided by lawf the
review of a judgment/ an orderf and a decree
(herein referred to as "decisions") of the Court
of Appeals shall be initiated by a petition for a
writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Utah.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals in this matter is
Diversified Equities/ Inc.f a Utah corporation/ and Dakal/
Inc./ a Utah corporation/ v. American Savings and Loan Association/ et al.f 739 P.2d 1133 (Utah App. 1987).

A copy of the

opinion is included in the Appendix hereto.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in not according

the trial court1s opinion proper deference?

2.

Were Plaintiffs bona fide purchasers of the real

property which is the subject matter of the instant lawsuit?

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES,
RULES AND REGULATIONS
The controlling statutes in this case are U.C.A. 57-1-6
(1953, as amended) and U.C.A. 57-3-3 (1953f as amended), both
statutes being set forth in full hereinafter in the Appendix
on Exhibit 1.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs brought this action seeking to quiet title
to real property in Diversified, subject to an equitable lien
in favor of Dakal (OR 2-11).

In the original action, Defen-

dant American Savings and Loan Association filed a counterclaim against the Plaintiffs alleging that Plaintiffs were
not bona fide purchasers of the property and have been unjustly enriched at American's expense (OR 161-163).
American

also filed

Originally

a cross-claim against Defendant Mark

Engar Liston alleging that he was still liable to American on
the Note and Deed of Trust he assumed when he (Liston) purchased the property

(OR 233-235) .

In addition, American

filed a third-party complaint against Third Party Defendant
Douglas

F.

Rydalch

alleging

that

Rydalch

enriched at American's expense (OR 219-228).
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was

unjustly

The trial court concluded

that neither of the Plain-

tiffs were bona fide purchasers of the property (TC 8 ) , even
though it quieted title to the property in Plaintiff Dakal,
Inc.

subject

to

an

equitable

lien

in

favor

of

American

Savings and Loan Association for the amount of unpaid principal and arrearages due and owing

(TC 10) .

The trial court

also found that the Defendant Rydalch was unjustly enriched
at the expense of Dakal in the amount of $37f 980, the sale
price of the property (TC 11).
The

trial

court

also

terminated

the

rights

and/or

liabilities of Defendant Mark Engar Liston to the property
and dismissed American's claims against him (TC 12).
The Utah Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
ruling and remanded with instructions to quiet title to Dakal
and/or Diversified, as their interests may appear, as against
American Savings and Loan Association.

Diversified Equities

at 1137.
The

Utah

Supreme

Court

granted

as

prayed

American

Savings and Loan Association's Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
Even though defendant American Savings and Loan Association was the

respondent

to plaintiffs' appeal before

the

Utah Court of Appeals, said defendant American Savings and
Loan Association is now before the Utah Supreme Court as an
"appellant" and

plaintiffs are now "respondents" before the

Utah Supreme Court.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about January 27, 1978, Defendant and respondent
American Savings and Loan Association made a loan to Donald
J. and Karen H. Bailey in the sum of $59f200, which loan was
evidenced by a Promissory Note and a Deed of Trust (F/F lf Tr
7 L 3-7f Defendant's Exs. 23 & 24). The real property (hereinafter "property") described

in said Deed of Trust is Lot

41, Tamlee Village, and is located in Salt Lake County, Utah.
The Deed of Trust was dated January 27, 1978, and recorded
February

2, 1978, in the records of

the Salt Lake County

Recorder's Office (F/F 1 and 2, Defendant's Ex. 24).
In October, 1980, the Baileys sold the property to Mark
Engar Liston who assumed the Baileys' loan with American upon
American's approval by executing a Mortgage Loan Assumption
Agreement, a Modification Agreement, and a Waiver of Deed of
Trust Non-Assumption Agreement.

In the documentation signed

by Liston when he assumed the above-described loan, the Deed
of Trust Non-Assumption Agreement was waived specifically and
exclusively for the conveyance from Bailey to Liston, but the
Deed of Trust Non-Assumption Agreement did remain in effect
as to subsequent sales (F/F 3 & 4, Defendant's Exs. 25, 26 &
27) .
On May 14, 1982, Liston gave to M & W Enterprises a
Warranty Deed conveying the property (which was subsequently
recorded) without the approval or knowledge of American, even
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though

the property was

still

to American1s

subject

Trust

Deed (F/F 5, Tr 7 L 17-20, Defendants Ex. 31).
On May 28/ 1982, without American's knowledge or approval/ M & W Enterprises sold the property to Defendant Douglas
F. Rydalch and his wifef Joan Rydalch
Deed conveying

the property

(F/F 6 ) . The Warranty

from M & W Enterprises to the

Rydalches, however, expressly

stated that the property was

subject to American1s Trust Deed to secure payment of a note
in the sum of $59,200
38) .

(F/F 7, Tr 11 L 5-9, Defendant's Ex.

M & W Enterprises also executed a Transfer and Assign-

ment of Reserve Account which assigned and transferred to the
Rydalches all amounts held by American for Payment of taxes
and insurance on the property (F/F 10, Defendant's Ex. 36).
The Buyer's Escrow Instructions, which were executed by
the Rydalches, also expressly

stated that the property was

subject to American's Trust Deed and also subject to the Deed
of Trust Non-Assumption Agreement, thus requiring the written
approval of American

prior to any sale or transfer of the

property (F/F 8, Defendant's Ex. 35). The closing officer at
Stewart Title Company further indicated that she very carefully explained to the Rydalches that the property was subject to American's Deed of Trust (F/F 12, Tr 10 L 19-23).
The
Waiver

Rydalches

Agreement

acknowledged

that

also

for

executed

an

Non-Assumption

Stewart

Title
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Indemnification

Clause

Company,

in which
the

escrow

and
they
and

closing

agent,

had

informed

them

of

the

existence

of

American's Non-Assumption Agreement, and that the Rydalches
would hold harmless and indemnify Stewart Title Company for
any consequences resulting from the failure to obtain written
approval from American prior to the transfer of the property
(F/F 9, Defendant's Ex. 37).
property

by

Academy

Based upon an appraisal of the

Appraisal

Associates,

the

Rydalches

received a title insurance policy from Stewart Title Company
in the amount of $103,000.

Schedule B of said policy clearly

states that the policy itself did not insure against any loss
by

reason

of American's

Deed

of

Trust

and

Non-Assumption

Agreement (F/F 11, Defendant's Ex. 40).
So

that

he might

purchase

Enterprises, Rydalch borrowed

the

property

from

M & W

$18,000 from Herb Holzer

(who

took a note for $19,080) on the basis that M & W Enterprises'
principal, Roy Miller, would

repay the loan within 30 days

from the time Rydalch borrowed the money (Tr 9 L 13-25, Tr 65
L 5-14, Rydalches1 Exs. 9, 10 & 11).

Roy Miller disappeared

after the sale from M & W Enterprises to Rydalch and has not
been available to repay the $19,080 note he originally agreed
to pay (Tr 10 L 2-8) .
After the sale of the property
Miller's

nonpayment,

Rydalch,

in

to him and after Roy

attempting

to

sell

the

property tried to determine what liens were still against it
(Tr 12 L 9-11) .

He then went to his attorney, Mr. Burnett,

-6-

and together they tried to determine what liens were still
outstanding against the property.

Mr. Burnett learned that

one of the liens on the property had already been paid off
(Tr 12 L 12-21).
three times.

Rydalch and his attorney called American

While the first call was inconclusive/ the last

two calls mistakenly indicated that American's loan had been
paid off (Tr 13 L 17-18; Tr 14 L 4-8).
In response to the telephone callsf American mistakenly
released its Trust Deed on the property by reconveyance which
was

recorded

on December

9,

1982

(F/F 13, Tr 14 L 8-14f

Defendant's Ex. 41).
The

reason

for American's

error

was that

there was

confusion with its accounting system because the Baileys had
taken out more than 34 loans with said institution

(Tr 14 L

20-23).
In the meantime, Herb Holzer began threatening Rydalch
and his family with bodily harm if Rydalch did not repay the
loan even though Rydalch had given Holzer a trust deed to the
property (Tr 15 L22-25).
Near the first of January 1983f Rydalch responded to a
newspaper advertisment which had been placed by Brad Pentelute, a self-described

mortgage

broker

who

specialized

distressed sales (Tr 16 L 21-25f Tr 17 L 1-6).

in

Rydalch met

with Pentelute, described his need to sell the property and
presented to Pentelute a copy of his title insurance which
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reflected American's interest in the property (Tr 17 L 7-15f
Defendant's

Ex.

40).

Rydalch

and

attorney

Burnett

both

assured Pentelute that American's lien had been satisfied and
attorney Burnett gave Pentelute a copy of the reconveyance
issued by mistake by American (Tr 17 L 16-24, Defendant's Ex.
41).

Pentelute called American and was told that the obliga-

tion on the property had been paid (Tr 18 L 15-20).
The Trust Deed in favor of American which had not been
paid, and for which American erroneously gave a reconveyance,
continues to be unpaid

(F/F 14) and as of May 3 f 1984, the

total

principal

remaining

unpaid

balance

owed

to American

under its Trust Deed was the sum of $56,742.92 and the arrearages under said Trust Deed (which total $15,886.00) consisted
of principal in the sum of $1,283.60, interest in the sum of
$12,626.12 and reserve account in the sum of $1,956.28 (F/F
14).
Brad Pentelute arranged the sale of the property from
the Rydalches to Dakal in behalf of Dakal and Wayne Peck (F/F
22, Tr 19 L 3-10).

According to the trial court's findings,

Pentelute was clearly acting as the agent of Dakal and Wayne
Peck, who was the President and principal executive officer
of both Diversified and Dakal, Inc., in arranging the sale of
the property from Third Party Defendant Rydalch to Plaintiff
Dakal, Inc. (F/F 23).
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The trial court further found that both Brad Pentelute
and Wayne Peck had substantial experience and dealings with
distressed properties and real estate transactions in general,
both were aware of the approximate market value of the property and Pentelute was aware of American's interest in the
property at the time the Rydalches acquired the property from
M & W Enterprises (F/F 27). Also, Wayne Peck paid a finder's
fee in the sum of $14,000 to Brad Pentelute for arranging the
property's purchase by Dakal (F/F 29 and Tr 19 L 6-8).
On

January

21, 1983,

for

the

sum

of

$37f 980

(with

$21,840 going to Herb Holzer and $16,140 to the Rydalches),
the Rydalches sold the subject property to Plaintiff Dakal,
Inc. which on the same day, sold the property to Plaintiff
Diversified Equitiesf Inc. for the sum of $60,000 (F/F 18 and
Tr 20 L 4-12).

Incidentally, Mr. Holzer paid Mr. Pentalute a

fee in the additional sum of $2,000 for acting as his intermediary in getting his (Holzer's) money (Tr 23 L 19-23).
The property was

sold by the Rydalches to Dakal for

approximately one-half or less of its market value (F/F 28,
Tr 11 L 22, 24-25, Tr 12 L 1-2), and Dakal paid the closing
costs of the conveyance from the Rydalches to Dakal (F/F 30,
Plaintiff's Ex. 5) .
On February 17, 1983, American recorded its Affidavit
indicating

that the Trust Deed, described

been released by mistake (F/F 16).
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hereinabove, had

According to the trial court's findingsf consequentlyf
it

is

clear

that

the

Rydalches

either

knew

or

certainly

should have known that their obligation to American had not
been paid

since

they

had not

done

so and

that

American's

release of its Trust Deed on the property had to be a mistake
(F/F 17, Defendant's Ex. 45).
The trial court further found that Wayne Peek, insofar
as

the

facts

and

events

regarding

the conveyances

of the

property from Third-party Defendant Rydalch to Dakalf Inc.,
and

from

Dakal,

Inc.,

to Diversified

Equities,

Inc., are

concerned, was the "alter ego" of both Dakal and Diversified
Equities (F/F 21).
The trial court's findings stated that Brad Pentelute
and/or Wayne

Peck

had more

than

sufficient

information

to

necessitate a further inquiry into whether Rydalch had actually satisfied the obligation to American and whether American
had made a mistake in releasing its Trust Deed on the property (F/F 24) .
According

to the trial

court, such

an inquiry would

have, in all probability, led to the discovery that while the
Rydalches, and no one else, had the obligation to pay American's loan, neither the Rydalches nor anyone else had paid
American and that American's release of its Trust Deed was,
in fact, a mistake (F/F 25).
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The trial court also stated that, in addition, Brad
Pentelute and/or Wayne Peck knew or should have known that
something was amiss regarding the Rydalches1 representation
of their fee simple ownership of the property.

Supporting

facts include the "distress" sale of the property by the
Rydalches to Dakal for approximately one-half or less of its
market value, the $14f000 finder's fee paid to Brad Pentelute
by Wayne Peck compared to the purchase price by Dakal of
$37,980, and the same-day transfer of the property from Dakal
to Diversified by Wayne Peck for $60,000 (F/F 26).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
American contends that in its decision of Diversified
Equities v. American Savings and Loan Association, 739 P.2d
1133

(Utah

reversed

App.1987)

wherein

the

the trial court, said

Utah

Court

Court

of Appeals

of Appeals decided

questions of state law in ways that conflict with prior
decisions of the Utah Supreme Court.

Thus, in so doing, the

Utah Court of Appeals rendered a decision that calls for an
exercise of the Utah Supreme Court's supervision because said
decision has departed so far from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings.
I.

The Utah Court of Appeals did not accord the

trial court's opinion proper deference because even in equity
actions, the Utah Supreme Court will not disturb the findings
of fact made below unless they appear to be clearly erroneous
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or against the weight of evidence.

American submits that the

trial court's findings are not at all erroneous or against
the weight

of evidence

let alone

"clearly" erroneous or

against the weight of evidence.
II.

Plaintiffs were not bona fide purchasers of the

property because:
A*
had purchased

They knew that the previous owner, Rydalch,
the property

subject to American's loan of

$60,000 and that no one else would have paid American;
B.

Plaintiff paid $37,980 for property which

had been appraised at $100,000 and Utah case law has held
that notice may be imputed from the mere fact that the sales
price was grossly disproportionate to the market value of the
property; and
C.

A mortgage discharged through mistake will

ordinarily be regarded in equity as still in existence with
its original priority as a lien.

ARGUMENT
A PANEL OF THE COURT OP APPEALS HAS DECIDED QUESTIONS
OF STATE LAW IN WAYS THAT ARE IN CONFLICT WITH DECISIONS OF
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT AND IN SO DOING, THE PANEL HAS RENDERED A DECISION THAT HAS SO FAR DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED
AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AS TO CALL FOR AN
EXERCISE OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT'S SUPERVISION.

-12-

I. THE COURT OP APPEALS DID NOT ACCORD THE TRIAL
COURT'S OPINION PROPER DEFERENCE.
The Court of Appeals did not accord the trial court's
opinion the deference to which it is entitled.

Whereas the

trial court found that Peck and Pentelute were chargeable
with actual notice (TC 6) and that Diversified and Dakal were
not bona fide purchasers of the property (TC 8), the Appeals
Court panel overturned the trial court's decision based upon
its review of the "stipulated facts."
at 1134 & 1136.

Diversified Equities

For example, on page 1136 of its decision,

the Court of Appeals' panel states that:
Generally, a trial court's findings of fact are
accorded great deference.
However, without
regard to the labels used, when those "findings"
proceed from stipulated facts, as in the instant
case, the "findings" are tantamount to conclusions of law, with the stipulation of facts being
the functional equivalent of true findings of
fact.
It is important to note, however, that the trial court's
findings amount to and are based on more than simply "stipulated facts."

According to the trial court's preamble to its

Findings of Fact, more than just "stipulated facts" were
presented for its review:
The parties represented at the hearing having
entered into and presented an oral stipulation of
facts, agreed to by all the parties so represented,
and said parties having introduced their respective
documents which were admitted into evidence, and
Defendant Mark Engar Liston having presented
evidence, and the Court having heard and examined
the evidence, both oral and documentary, introduced
by the respective parties hereto, and having
examined the memoranda of counsel, . . . [Emphasis
added.]
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At the time this matter was heard by the trial court on
April 19, 1984, Defendant Mark Engar Liston presented three
witnesses: himself, his prior attorney Ben Knowlton, and the
Plaintiffs'

principal/

Wayne

Peck

(Tr 27-63).

Thus, the

trial court had the opportunity to not only review the documentary evidence, but to observe and judge the demeanor of at
least two important witnesses as well.
That the trial court relied on more than just "stipulated facts" is demonstrated by its own statement contained
in its Memorandum Decision:
The Court has carefully reviewed the Transcript
of Stipulation of Facts of April 19, 1984, agreed
to by all the parties, and has examined all of
the documentary evidence received, and considered
the testimony of the witnesses (TC 2 ) . [Emphasis
added.]
Thus, the trial court in this case did not simply gloss
over

"stipulated

facts."

By its own statement, the court

"carefully" reviewed the Transcript of Stipulation of facts,
"examined" all of the documentary evidence and "considered"
the testimony of witnesses (TC 2 ) .
Certainly

an

appellate

court

is

not

at

liberty

to

undertake an independent retrial of all factual issues arising in a suit in equity... the trial court1s disposition of
the matter is entitled to a certain deference and should be
disturbed only where necessary to prevent manifest injustice.
Jackson v. Jackson, 617 P.2d 338, 340 (Utah 1980).
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Further, even in equity actions where it is the Supreme
Court's responsibility to review evidence as well as law, the
Supreme

Court

will

not

disturb

the

findings

of fact made

below unless they appear to be clearly erroneous or against
the weight of evidence.

Dang v. Cox Corp., 655 P.2d 658, 660

(Utah, 1982); McBride v. McBride, 581 P.2d 996, 997

(Utah,

1978) .
In the case of Dang v. Cox Corp., the Utah Supreme
Court stated that it "will not substitute its judgment for
that of the trial court or disturb the trial court's findings
of

fact

when

they

are

admissible evidence."

based

on substantial

competent

and

Dang at 660.

The Utah Court of Appeals has also stated that it is
not that court's function to substitute its judgment for that
of the fact

finder, State v. Gabaldon, 735 P.2d

(Utah App. 1987) , and yet,

in the

instant

410, 412

case, the Utah

Court of Appeals has precisely substituted its judgment for
that of the trial court.

Further, the Utah Court of Appeals

has stated that it will not substitute its judgment for that
of the trial court nor disturb the trial court's findings of
fact when they are based on substantial, competent and admissible evidence.

Wood v. Weenig, 736 P.2d

1053

(Utah App.

1987).
In equity cases, the Supreme Court reverses the trial
court's findings only when the evidence clearly preponderates
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against them.

Bradford v. Alvey & Sons, 612 P.2d 1240 (Utah

1980); Tanner v. Baadsgaard, 612 P.2d 345 (Utah 1980); Parks
Enterprises v. New Century Realty, 652 P.2d 918, 920 (Utah
1982); Jensen v. Brown, 639 P.2d 150, 151-152 (Utah 1981);
Crimmins v. Simonds, 636 P.2d 478 (Utah 1981); Provo City v.
Lambert, 574 P.2d 727 (Utah 1978).
applied

This is the same standard

in those cases which state that the Utah Supreme

Court reverses only when the trial court's finding is against
the clear weight of the evidence.

McBride v. McBride, supra;

Jensen v. Brown, 639 P.2d 150, 152 (Utah 1981).
American
evidence

submits that as will be shown herein, the

clearly

court's findings.

does not preponderate

against

the trial

Certainly there was no doubt on the part

of the trial court wherein the trial court concluded that the
"evidence,

particularly

when

viewed

as

a whole, clearly

establishes that plaintiffs were not bona fide purchasers of
the property" (TC 8) [emphasis added].
Thus, although the fact findings of a trial judge in an
equity suit may not be conclusive on appeal, yet a presumption exists in favor of their correctness and they will never
be lightly disturbed.

5A C.J.S. 589, Appeal & Error §1663.

The trial court's stated Findings of Fact include the
following:
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17.
Consequently, it is clear that the
Rydalches either knew or certainly should have
known that their obligation to American had not
been paid since they had not done so and that
American's release of its Trust Deed on the
property had to be a mistake.
18.
Wayne Peck, insofar as the facts and
events regarding the conveyances of the property
from Third-party Defendant Rydalch to Dakal,
Inc., and from Dakal, Inc., to Diversified Equities, Inc., are concerned, was the "alter ego" of
both Dakal and Diversified Equities.
24.
Brad Pentelute and/or Wayne Peck had
more than sufficient information to necessitate a
further inquiry into whether Rydalch had actually
satisfied the obligation to American and whether
American had made a mistake in releasing its
Trust Deed on the property.
26.
Such an inquiry would have, in all
probability, lead to the discovery that while the
Rydalches, and no one else, had the obligation to
pay American1s loan, neither the Rydalches nor
anyone else had paid American and that American1s
release of its Trust Deed was, in fact, a mistake.
27. In addition, Brad Pentelute and/or
Wayne Peck knew or should have known that something was amiss regarding the Rydalches1 representation of their fee simple ownership of the
property.
Supporting facts include the "distress" sale of the property by the Rydalches to
Dakal for approximately one-half or less of its
market value, the $14,000 finder's fee paid to
Brad Pentelute by Wayne Peck compared to the
purchase price by Dakal of $37,980, and the
same-day transfer of the property from Dakal to
Diversified by Wayne Peck for $60,000.
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That the above "Findings" are true findings of fact is
supported by Johnson v. Bell, 666 P.2d 308 (Utah, 1983),
which indicated that the determination of whether a purchaser
received actual notice of prior unrecorded interests is a
question of fact.

Johnson at 310.

In addition, the determination of whether the duty of
inquiry was satisfied, is also a question of fact.

G. Thomp-

son, 8 Thompson on Real Property, §4236 at p. 451 (1963);
U.S. Fiduciary Corp. v. Loma Vista Associates, 675 P.2d 724,
728

(Ariz. App. 1983)

(whether due inquiry was made is a

question of fact); Berge v. Fredericks, 591 P.2d 246, 249
(Nev. 1979) (the question whether due inquiry was made is one
of fact to be investigated by the jury).
American submits that the trial court's opinion should
have been accorded greater deference by the Utah Court of
Appeals not only because of the trial judge's careful review
of the stipulated facts and examination of the documentary
evidence, but the trial court had the advantage of being able
to observe the demeanor of three witnesses, one of whom, Mr.
Wayne Peck, is the principal

of both plaintiffs

in this

action (Tr 22 L 5-6, Tr 59 L 17-21).
The importance of the trial court's vantage point in
this regard is not only recognized by Rule 52(a) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure ("...due regard shall be given to
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the

opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility

of the witnesses") but has been clearly ennunciated by the
Utah Supreme Court which has stated that "while the Supreme
Court may review questions of both law and fact in equity
cases, it is not bound to substitute its judgment for that of
the trial court, and because of the trial court's advantaged
position, the Supreme Court gives considerable deference to
its findings and judgment.

See Erickson v. Beardall, 20

Utah 2d 287, 437 P.2d 210 (1968); Etton v. Utah State Retirement Board, 503 P.2d 137 (Utah 1972); Fisher v. Taylor, 572
P.2d 393 (Utah 1977); Bustamante v. Bustamante, 645 P.2d 40
(Utah 1982); Nupetco Ass, v. Jenkins, 669 P.2d 877 (Utah
1983); Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430 (Utah 1983); Shioji v.
Shioji, 712 P.2d 197 (Utah 1985); Jeppesen v. Jeppesen, 684
P.2d 69 (Utah 1984) .

II.

A.

PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT BONA FIDE PURCHASERS OF THE
PROPERTY.
PLAINTIFFS TOOK THE PROPERTY WITH NOTICE OF

AMERICAN'S INTEREST.

American respectfully contends that Plaintiffs were not
bona fide purchasers of the subject property because they
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took with notice of American's

interest and because of the

relatively

paid

land.

small

sum

of money

by Plaintiffs

for the

According to Pender v. Dowse, et al.y 1 Utah 2d 283,

265 P.2d 644 (1954) , in order to be entitled to protection as
a bona fide purchaser, the purchase must also have been made
in good

faith

and a purchase with notice

purchase made male fide.

is considered

a

Pender at 289.

The language of U.C.A. 57-1-6 (1953, as amended) which
statute is set forth in the attached Appendix) indicates that
a third person takes without notice of an instrument if not
recorded unless the purchaser has actual notice.
Supreme

Court

has

held

notice" is satisfied
information

of

facts

that

the

requirement

The Utah
of

"actual

[ilf a party dealing with the land had
which

would

put

a prudent

man

upon

inquiry and which, if pursued, would lead to actual knowledge
as to the state of the title.

Johnson v. Bell

(supra) at

310; Toland v. Corey, 6 Utah 392, 24 P. 190 (1890); McGarry
v. Thompson, 114 Utah 442, 201 P.2d 288 (1948).
It can thus be seen that actual notice in Utah is more
synonymous with constructive notice

in other contexts.

In

the Utah cases of McGarry v. Thompsony 114 Utah 442, 451, 201
P.2d

288

(1948) , Universal

Motors, 8 Utah 2d

C.I.T. Corporation

275, 333 P.2d

628, 629

Supreme Court noted with approval that:
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v. Courtesy

(1959) the Utah

[Wlhatever is notice enough to excite attention
and put the party on his guard and call for
inquiry is notice of everything to which such
inquiry might have led*
When a person has sufficient information to lead him to a fact, he
shall be deemed conversant of it. Id. at 451.
Further, the Utah Supreme Court has noted that it is
notice, not knowledge, that the purchaser must have, and it
need not be actual notice - constructive notice is sufficient
to defeat

the purchaser's

claim.

Constructive

notice can

occur when circumstances arise that should put a reasonable
person on guard so as to require further inquiry on his part.
Meyer v. General American Corp., 569 P.2d
1977) .

1094, 1097

(Utah

Thus, under Utah law, when notice of something is

enough to excite a reasonable man's attention and put him on
inquiry,

it

might lead.

is notice of everything

to which such inquiry

O'Reilly v. McLean, 84 Utah 551, 37 P.2d 770,

775 (1934); Peterson v. United States, 511 F.Supp. 250, 257
( C D . Utah 1981) .
American submits that Plaintiffs, by and through Pentelute and Peck, had more than enough
their

attention

and put

them

information to excite

on their

guard

and call for

inquiry so that they had notice of everything to which such
inquiry might have led, i.e., that neither the Rydalches nor
anyone else had paid American's loan and the Trust Deed had
been released by mistake.
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Pentelute, who acted as the agent for the Plaintiffs,
was aware of American's lien as evidenced by the information
he received from Rydalch and Rydalch's attorney, Mr. Burnett,
which

included

documents

in Mr. Burnett's possession and a

copy of the title insurance policy received by Rydalch at the
time he purchased the property, said copy showing American's
lien but not showing

an existing lien of Beehive Thrift &

Loan. (Tr 17-18, Defendant's Ex. 40).
Further, both Pentelute and Peck had substantial experience and dealings with distresed properties and real estate
transactions in general and both were aware of the approximate market value of the property.
Other
that

facts

Pentelute

and

and/or

events which

(Tr 16-19, F/F 27).
support

Peck knew or should

the

kave known that

something was amiss regarding the Rydalches'
of their

fee

conclusion

representation

simple ownership of the property

include the

"distress" sale of the property by the Rydalches to Dakal for
approximately one-half or less of its market value (Tr 11-12,
15, 19), the $14,000.00 finders fee paid to Pentelute by Peck
compared

to the purchase price by Dakal of

$37,980.00

(Tr

19-21) , and the same-day transfer of the property from Dakal
to Diversified by Peck for $60,000.00 (Tr 20-21, Plaintiff's
Exs. 2, 6 ) .
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All of the above-mentioned evidence, particularly when
viewed as a wholef clearly establishes that Dakal and Diversified were not bona fide purchasers of the property under
Utah statutory and case law (TC 7-8).
Pentelute represented himself as a mortgage broker and
was in the business of reviewing and finding distress sales
and has reviewed hundreds of possible transactions with the
objective of buying distressed properties.

As an experienced

and sophisticated dealer with real property, he should then
have been aware that with Rydalch as the fee simple title
holder, no one else would have had an obligation, let alone
the

inclination,

to

pay

American's

loan.

Pentelute,

as

Plaintiffs' agent, after having been made aware of American's
interest in the property, had a duty to ascertain whether or
not Rydalch had satisfied American's obligation by paying it.
By not making said determination, the Plaintiffs cannot now
represent

that

they

took

the

property

without

notice

of

American's interest.
The evidence
provide

clear,

and

facts

persuasive

submitted

and

to the trial

compelling

support

court

for

the

trial court's finding that Plaintiffs Diversified and Dakal
did have actual notice of American's interest.

The evidence,

when viewed as a whole, is unequivocally sufficient notice to
"excite attention"

and

"put a prudent man upon

inquiry."

Evidence is considered sufficient to support a trial court's
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findings

if

it

those findings.
(1951) .

depicts

circumstances

sufficient

to

infer

Pixton v. Dunnf 120 Utah 638, 238 P.2d 408

Reasonable inferences drawn from the facts of the

instant above clearly support the trial court's decision.
Common sense and the Plaintiffs1 knowledge of the real
estate market would

undoubtedly

have alerted

Plaintiffs to

the irregularities regarding the subject property.

They knew

that

subject

to almost

Plaintiffs knewf

or should

Rydalch

had purchased

the property

$60,000 worth of indebtedness.
have

known,

that

no

one

else

would

have

paid

American.

Plaintiffs knew or should have known that a $60,000 encumbrance would not disappear, in the space of six months, into
thin air. The repeated phone calls and conversations concerning American's release of its Trust Deed evidence that Plain
tiffs themselves were highly suspicious of that transaction.
When the evidence is viewed as a whole with the inferences
that

must

logically

be

drawn

therefrom,

it

is clear

that

Plaintiffs had actual notice of American's interest and the
mistake which had inadvertently been made.

Therefore, Plain-

tiffs cannot be accorded the status of bona fide purchasers.

B.

UTAH CASE LAW PROVIDES THAT DISPROPORTIONATE SALES

PRICE TO PROPERTY MARKET VALUE MAY PUT PURCHASER ON NOTICE.
Notice may be imputed from the mere fact that the sales
price was grossly disproportionate to the market value of the
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property.

It is well established Utah law

that a grossly

disproportionate sales price may, of itself, be enough to put
a purchaser

on notice of a prior unrecorded

interest.

In

Lawley v. Hickenlooperf 61 Ut. 298, 212 Pac. 526 (1922), the
Supreme Court cited with approval Section 39 Cyc 1718:
Where the contract under which the purchaser buys
is sufficient on its face to put him on inquiry
as to what consideration was or where it plainly
shows consideration has not been paid or performed, he is chargeable with notice thereof. A
nominal or a grossly inadequate consideration
recited in a deed is a sufficient circumstance,
for a reasonable time after such deed is made and
recorded, to put a purchaser on inquiry. Lawley
at 530. [Emphasis added.]
The position

adopted

by the Utah court

in Lawley is

consistent with the postition of the Restatement of the Law
on Restitution:
The transfer is for value although the consideration is of less value than the property transferred. The difference in value, however, may be
evidence that the transferee had notice that the
transferor held the property subject to an equity
in favor of another. Restatement of Restitution,
Section 173, Comment b.
In Meyer v. General American Corp., 569 P.2d 1094 (Utah
1977),

the

purchaser

of

a

caterpillar

bought

it because of its low price and knew that a cater-

pillar sold for a much higher value.
Supreme Court this circumstance

testified

that

he

According to the Utah

alone is sufficient to put
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the purchaser on notice that the transaction may be tainted
and that other parties are likely to be involved.

Meyer at

1097.
According

to U.C.A. 57-3-3

(1953 as amended), "every

conveyance of real estate hereafter made, which shall not be
recorded as provided in this title, shall be void as against
any

subsequent

purchaser

in good faith and for a valuable

consideration of the same real estate, or any portion thereof
where his own conveyance shall be first duly recorded.
in order

to prevail, Plaintiffs

must

show that

Thus,

they were

subsequent purchasers in good faith and for value.

The land

which is the subject matter of this suit at the time it was
purchased by the Plaintiffs had been appraised as having a
market value of $100,000 (Tr 11 L 21-22, Defendant's Ex. 39),
and

yet

Plaintiff

Dakal

purchased

the

land

for

a meager

$37,980 (Tr 20 L 11-12, Plaintiff's Ex. 5 ) .
In the case of Pender v. Bird, 119 Utah 91 224 P.2d
1057, (1957), the Supreme Court of Utah held that the recording statute was not enacted to protect one whose ignorance of
the

title

is deliberate

nominal consideration

and

intentional

nor

does

a mere

satisfy the requirement that valuable

consideration must be paid, but the purpose of the statute is
to protect

one who honestly believes he is acquiring

title and who
that belief.

invests some substantial

good

sum in reliance on

American contends that by Plaintiff Dakal only
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paying a little more than one-half of the lowest appraised
value of the property that such a small payment casts great
doubt upon Plaintiffs1 stated beliefs that they were acquiring

good

title. See

also Wisconsin

River

Land

Company

v.

Selover, 135 Wis. 594, 116 N.W. 265, 267; Beach v. Faust, 2
Cal 2d 290, 40 P.2d 822; and Warden v. Windotte Sav. Bank, 47
Cal. App. 2d, 352, 117 P.2d 910.
Further in the case of Philips v. Latham, 523 S.W. 2d
19 (1975) , the court held
necessarily

require

that although good faith does not

payment

of the full value of the pro-

perty, a purchaser who pays a grossly inadequate price cannot
be considered a good-faith purchaser for value.

C.

MORTGAGE DISCHARGED BY MISTAKE ORDINARILY REGARDED

AS STILL IN EXISTENCE.
In

deciding

disregarded
mistake will
existence.

the

this
rule

matter
that

ordinarily
In

the

a

the

mortgage

be regarded

case

of

Court

Mills

of

Appeals

discharged

also

through

in equity as still in
v. Mills, 305

P.2d

61

(Calif. 1956), the Court reiterated a general and applicable
principle of law when it stated, "the court of equity will
keep alive or restore a lien where the equities of the case
require

it and the parties

extinguished
mistake.

as where

it

intended

has been

Mills at 69-70.
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that

it should not be

discharged

by fraud or

In the case of Drake Lumber Co, v. Semple, 130 S. 577
(Fla. 1930), through the unconscious mistake of a bank teller,
a note and mortgage were marked "paid" and extinguished,

the

Supreme Court of Florida elaborated on the equitable questions

involved

stating,

"a

court

of

equity

will

keep

an

encumbrance alive, or consider it extinguished, as will best
serve the purpose of justice, and the actual and just intention of the party; and a mortgage discharged through mistake
will ordinarily be regarded in equity as still in existence."
Finally,

in

P.168, 27 OR. 205

the

case

of

Kern

v.

Hottaling

(1895), the Supreme Court

Co., 40

of Oregon was

also faced with the situation where a mortgage was mistakenly
cancelled.

Kern sued Hottaling to have the cancellation of

the mortgage set aside and to have the same reinstated.

The

Supreme Court of Oregon, in granting Kern's request, stated,
"...the mortgage released through mistake may be restored in
equity, and given its original priority as a lien."

Kern at

169.
By cancelling American1s reconveyance and restoring its
equitable lien, this Court would be consistent with Thompson
on Real Property, 667, Payment and Discharge of Mortgages,
Section 4813, which indicates that a release, satisfaction or
discharge of a mortgage by fraud or made through mistake may
be cancelled if other parties, having no notice of the fraud,
[mistake] have not in the meantime acquired an interest in
the property".

Plaintiffs had notice of American's mistake.

-28-

CONCLUSION
In the instant case, American's Trust Deed was mistaken
ly reconveyed.

The underlying obligation was not, and has

not been satisfied.

Plaintiffs had notice of American's

mistake and equity therefore requires that the Plaintiffs
take the property

subject

to American's

lien.

American

therefore contends that the Utah Court of Appeals' opinion in
this matter is in conflict with decisions of the Utah Supreme
Court (see Dangy McBridef Pender v. Dowse and McGarryy supra)
because the Court of Appeals not only disturbed the Findings
of Fact made by the trial court which clearly was in the best
position to make said findings, but also failed to hold that
plaintiffs were not bona fide purchasers of the real property.

American respectfully submits that the trial court's

findings were not erroneous, let alone "clearly erroneous,"
or against the weight of evidence.
In footnote 5 on page 1137 of its opinion of this case,
the Court of Appeals avers that:
It would stretch the notion of inquiry notice
beyond the breaking point to hold that the answer
Pentelute received to his inquiry of American
should have prompted him to go further.
What
should he have done?
Diversified Equitites at 1137.
In answer to its own question, the Appellate Court
ignored the obvious answer which is that Pentelute should

-29-

have informed American that even though the record indicated
that American had released its lien, the question remained as
to whether the release had been executed by mistake because
Pentelute possessed information which suggested that the loan
had not been paid.
Based
that

the

upon

Court

the
of

above, American

Appeals

has

respectfully

rendered

an

submits

opinion

which

conflicts with prior decisions of the Utah Supreme Court and
in so doing has so far departed from the accepted and usual
course

of

judicial

proceedings

that

this

Honorable

Court

should reverse the Court of Appeals' Opinion and affirm the
decision of the trial court*
Respectfully submitted this 29th day of March, 1988.
CLYDE, PRATT & SNOW

Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
American Savings & Loan
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CERTIFICATE OP SERVICE
I hereby certify that four (4) copies of the foregoing
Appellant's Brief Upon Writ of Certiorari to Utah Court of
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eight (8) copies of said Petition by first-class mail, postage prepaid, on March 29, 1988, to the offices of Jerome
H. Mooney and Arthur M. Strong at 236 South 300 East, Salt
Lake City, Utah

84111.

rT Miffl/ift Williams, III
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Exhibit 1 —

U.C.A. 57-1-6
U.C.A. 57-3-3

Exhibit 2 —

Trial Court's Memorandum Decision

Exhibit 3 —

Trial Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law

Exhibit 4 —

Trial Court's Judgment and Order

Exhibit 5 —

Court of Appeals' Opinion (Diversified Equities
v. American Savings and Loan Associationf
739 P.2d 1133 (Utah App. 1987))

OCA 57-1-6
RECORDING NECESSARY TO IMPART NOTICE - OPERATION AND EFFECT INTEREST OF PERSON NOT NAMED IN INSTRUMENT Every conveyance of real estate, and every instrument of
writing setting forth an agreement to convey any real estate
or whereby any real estate may be affected, to operate as
notice to third persons shall be proved or acknowledged and
certified in the manner prescribed by this title and recorded
in the office of the recorder of the county in which such
real estate is situated, but shall be valid and binding
between the parties thereto without such proofs, acknowledgment, certification or record, and as to all other persons
who have had actual notice. Neither the fact that an instrument, recorded as herein provided, recites only a nominal
consideration, nor the fact that the grantee in such instrument is designated as trustee, or that the conveyance otherwise purports to be in trust without naming the beneficiaries
or stating the terms of the trust, shall operate to charge
any third person with a notice of interest of any person
or persons not named in such instrument or the grantor or
grantors; but the grantee may convey the fee or such lesser
interest as was conveyed to him by such instrument free and
clear of all claims not disclosed by the instrument or by an
instrument recorded as herein provided setting forth the
names of the beneficiaries, specifying the interest claimed
in describing the property charged with such interest.

OCA 57-3-3
EFFECT OF FAILURE TO RECORD Every conveyance of real estate hereafter made, which shall
not be recorded as provided in this title, shall be void as
against any subsequent purchaser in good faith and for a
valuable consideration of the same real estate, or any portion thereof, where his own conveyance shall be first duly
recorded.

Ex. 1

nrcswPO

J UN - 1 1984
CLYDE & PRATT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DIVERSIFIED EQUITIES, INC., a
Utah corporation, and
DAKAL, INC., a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiffs,

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

:

CIVIL NO. C-83-2042

:

vs.

:

MARK ENGAR LISTON, et al.,
Defendants.

:
:

I.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

This matter comes before the Court on the Complaint of
plaintiffs Diversified Equities, Inc. and Dakal, Inc. (hereinafter "Diversified" and "Dakal", respectively) to quiet title
in plaintiffs to a duplex and lot (hereinafter "the property"),
more particularly described as Lot 41, Tamlee Village, located
at 7680 South 375 East, Salt Lake County, Utah.

In addition,

defendant American Savings and Loan Association (hereinafter
"American"), in plaintiffs1 original action, has filed:

(1)

a Counterclaim against plaintiffs Diversified and Dakal, alleging
that plaintiffs are not bona fide purchasers of the property
and have been unjustly enriched a)t American's expense; (2) a
Cross-claim against defendant Mark Engar Liston (hereinafter

Fit

O
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"Liston"), alleging that Liston is still liable to American
on the Note and Deed of Trust originally executed by Donald
J. and Karen Bailey, which Liston assumed when he purchased
the property from the Baileys; and (3) a Third-Party Complaint
against Third Party defendant Douglas F. Rydalch (hereinafter
"Rydalch"), alleging that Rydalch has been unjustly enriched
at American's expense.
II.

FACTS

The above-mentioned claims of the parties have arisen
from an extremely complex and lengthy scenario of facts and
events dating back to 1978.

The Court has carefully reviewed

the Transcript of Stipulation of Facts of April 19, 1984, agreed
to by all the parties, and has examined all of the documentary
evidence received, and considered the testimony of the witnesses.
The Court concludes that any attempt to set forth the facts
and events leading up to and necessary for the disposition of
the claims of the parties would be in most part a reiteration
of the Stipulation of Facts, and the parties should therefore
refer to such Stipulation when necessary.

In the following

Conclusions of the Court, reference will be made, where
appropriate, to the particular Exhibits and pages of the Transcript of Stipulation relied upon by the Court.
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CONCLUSIONS

The parties should bear in mind that a court of equity
may exercise broad discretion in framing its decrees in order
to adopt the relief granted to the circumstances of a particular
case, and such relief should be adjusted in a manner which is
just and equitable and affords protection to and finally
determines the rights and claims of all parties.

An equity

court is not bound by strict or rigid legal remedies or by the
particular pleadings setting forth the specific claims for relief
of the parties.

See, e.g., 30A C.J.S. Equity § 599, et seq.;

27 Am.Jur.2d Equity § 102, et seq.
As stated succinctly by the Utah Supreme Court in Travelers
Insurance Co. v. Lewis, 531 P.2d 484, 485 (Utah 1975), "A court
of equity can and should regard as done that which ought to
be done; and similarly, it can and should regard as not having
been done that which ought not to have been done."

These state-

ments are consistent with Rule 54(c)(1), U.R.C.P., which states
in pertinent part that "every final judgment shall grant the
relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is
entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in
his pleadings."
The Court has reviewed the legal Memoranda submitted by
the parties and conducted its own research into the numerous
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legal questions presented and, with the foregoing statements
regarding its equitable powers in mind, makes the following
Conclusions concerning the rights and liabilities of all the
parties:
A.

NEITHER DAKAL NOR DIVERSIFIED WAS A
BONA FIDE PURCHASER OF THE PROPERTY

The key issue as to whether Dakal and/or Diversified
should be accorded the status of a bona fide purchaser and thus
be entitled to prevail over American's claims against the
property is whether Dakal and Diversified had "actual notice"
of American's security interest in the property which was
mistakenly released by American prior to the conveyance of the
property from Rydalch to Dakal and Dakal to Diversified.

It

is readily apparent from Utah case law and the general weight
of authority that "actual notice", as used in conjunction with
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-6 and § 57-3-3 (1953 as amended) has been
interpreted to include implied or constructive notice.

The

Utah Supreme Court has expounded upon this interpretation of
"actual notice" in a long line of cases dating back prior to
statehood.

Reiterating the holding of the seminal case before

the Court in 1890, in its very recent decision of Johnson vs.
Bell, 666 P.2d 308, 310 (Utah 1983), the Court defined "actual
notice" as follows:
This statute was under examination by
this Court in Toland vs. Corey, 6 Utah
392, 24 P. 190 (1890) where we held
that the "actual notice" required by
§ 57-1-6 was satisfied if a party
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dealing with the land had information
of facts which would put a prudent man
upon inquiry and which, if pursued,
would lead to actual knowledge as to
the state of the title. See a similar
expression in McGarry vs. Thompson,
114 Utah 442, 201 P.2d 288 (1948)
[Emphasis added]
The Utah Supreme Court has further expounded upon the
nature of the "inquiry" required of a "prudent" man in order
to be a bona fide purchaser.

In McGarry vs. Thompson, 114 Utah

442, 201 P.2d 288 (1948), cited by the court in Johnson vs.
Bell, supra, the court made the following statement:
[Wjhatever is notice enough to excite
attention and put the party on his guard
and call for inquiry is notice of everything to which such inquiry might have
led. When a person has sufficient
information to lead him to a fact, he
shall be deemed conversant of it.
[Emphasis added] 201 P.2d at 293.
Additionally, in Pender vs. Dowse, 1 Utah 2d 283,
265 P.2d 644, 649 (1954), the court held as follows:
Moreover, the inquiry must be made at a
reliable source from which the true
state of facts will be naturally
disclosed, it is not sufficient that
the purchaser make an inquiry of a
person when he knows that it is to
such person's interest to misrepresent
or conceal the existence of the outstanding interests and that such
person does deny its existence.
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In applying the foregoing legal principles enunciated
by the Utah Supreme Court to the facts and events of this case,
the Court concludes that neither Dakal nor Diversified was a
bona fide purchaser of the property.

The Court is in substantial

agreement with the arguments of American set forth on pages
8-10 of its Memorandum of April 25, 1984.
Brad Pentelute was clearly acting as the agent of Dakal
and Wayne Peck, the President and principal executive officer
of Dakal and Diversified, in arranging the sale of the property
from Rydalch to Dakal (Tr. pp. 16-23).

The Court also concludes

that Wayne Peck, insofar as the facts and events regarding the
conveyances of the property from Rydalch to Dakal and from Dakal
to Diversified are concerned, was the "alter ego" of both Dakal
and Diversified (Tr. pp. 18-22; Plaintiffs1 Exs. 5 & 6;
Defendants1 Exs. 42 & 43; Norman vs. Murray First Thrift & Loan
Co., 596 P.2d 1028, 1030 (Utah 1979), and cases cited therein).
Consequently, in determining whether Dakal or Diversified
should be accorded bona fide purchaser status, the "actual
notice" (as defined by the Utah Supreme Court in Johnson,
McGarry, and Pender, supra) of both Pentelute and Peck are
imputed to both Dakal and Diversified in regard to American's Trust
Deed which was mistakenly reconveyed by American.
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The Court concludes that Pentelute and/or Peck had more
than sufficient information to necessitate a further inquiry
into whether Rydalch had actually "satisfied" the obligation
to American and whether American had made a mistake in releasing
its Trust Deed on the property.

Such an inquiry would have

in all probability led to the discovery that neither the
Rydalches nor anyone else had paid American and that American's
release of its Trust Deed was in fact a mistake.

Both Pentelute

and Peck had substantial experience and dealings with distressed
properties and real estate transactions in general, both were
aware of the approximate market value of the property, and
Pentelute was aware of American's interest in the property at
the time the Rydalches acquired the property from M & W Enterprises
through Roy Miller (Tr. pp. 16-19; Defendants1 Exs. 35, 36,
38, 40).
In addition, the Court finds that other facts and events
support its conclusion that Pentelute and/or Peck knew or should
have known that something was amiss regarding the Rydalches1
representation of their fee simple ownership of the property.
Such facts and events include the "distress" sale of the property
by the Rydalches to Dakal for approximately one-half or less
of its market value (Tr. pp. 11-12, 15, 19), the $14,000.00
finders fee paid to Pentelute by Peck compared to the purchase
price by Dakal of $37,980.00 (Tr. pp. 19-21), and the same-day
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transfer of the property from Dakal to Diversified by Peck for
$60,000.00 (Tr. pp. 20-21;

Plaintiffs1 Exs. 2, 6 ) .

Therefore, the Court concludes that all of the abovementioned evidence, particularly when viewed as a whole, clearly
establishes that Dakal and Diversified were not bona fide purchasers
of the property under Utah statutory and case law.
B.

THE RYDALCHES HAVE "UNCLEAN HANDS" AND ARE NOT
ENTITLED TO FAVORABLE EQUITABLE RELIEF

Perhaps the most important and time-honored maxim of equity
is that one who comes before a court of equity with "unclean
hands" is not entitled to any benefit or favorable treatment.
Upon examining all of the evidence, this Court concludes that
the Rydalches do have "unclean hands" by reason of their representations of fee simple ownership of the property with no security
interest in favor of American and their conveyance of the property
without the written or oral approval of American.
The warranty deed conveying the property from M & W Enterprises
to the Rydalches expressly stated that the property was subject
to American's Trust Deed (Defendants' Ex. 38). The Buyer's
Escrow Instructions, executed by the Rydalches, also expressly
stated that the property was subject to American's Trust Deed
and also subject to the Deed of Trust Non-Assumption Agreement
requiring the written approval of American prior to any sale
or transfer of the property (Defendants1 Ex. 35). The Rydalches
also executed an Indemnification and Waiver agreement for
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Non-Assumption Clause in which they acknowledged that Stewart
Title Co., the escrow and closing agent, had informed them of
the existence of American's Non-Assumption Agreement, and that
the Rydalches would hold harmless and indemnify Stewart Title
Co. for any consequences resulting from the failure to obtain
written approval from American prior to the transfer of the
property (Defendants' Ex. 37). M & W also executed a Transfer
and Assignment of Reserve Account, which assigned and transferred
to the Rydalches all amounts held by American for payment of
taxes and insurance on the property (Defendants' Ex. 36). Based
upon an appraisal of

the property by Academy Appraisal Associates

(Defendants' Ex. 39), the Rydalches received a Title Insurance
Policy from Stewart Title Co. in the amount of $103,000.00
Schedule B of said policy clearly states that the policy itself
did not insure against any loss by reason of American's Deed
of Trust and Non-Assumption agreement (Defendants' Ex. 40).
The closing officer at Stewart Title Co. further indicated that
she very carefully explained to the Rydalches that the property
was subject to American's Deed of Trust.
Consequently, it is clear that the Rydalches either knew
or certainly should have known that their obligation to American
had not been paid, since they had not done so, and that American's
release of its Trust Deed on the property had to be a mistake.
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The Court therefore concludes that the Rydalches have
"unclean hands" and are not entitled to favorable equitable
relief.

It is most unfortunate and the Court empathizes with

the Rydalches that they have been the victims of an apparent
fraud perpetrated by Roy Miller through M & W Enterprises.
However, such action by Miller offers no legal or equitable
justification for the actions of the Rydalches regarding their
representations that American's interest in the property had
been satisfied and their sale of the property to Dakal.
C.

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT -- THE RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES
OF ALL THE PARTIES BEFORE THE COURT

As the Court has concluded that Dakal and Diversified
were not bona fide purchasers of the property, and in conjunction
with the overall equitable remedy decided by the Court, infra,
it is the judgment of the Court that all transactions regarding
the transfer of the property from Dakal to Diversified are
rescinded, and all rights and/or liabilities of Diversified
to the property or Dakal, respectively, are terminated.
Title to the property is quieted in Dakal, subject to
an equitable lien in favor of American for the amount of unpaid
principal and arrearages due

and owing and upon precisely the

same payment terms of principal and interest as American's original
Trust Deed and all other terms of said Trust Deed, with the
specific exception that the sole obligor or trustor of American's
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Dakal shall have six months

to bring current all arrearages for monthly payments and any
arrearages for the reserve account to pay taxes and insurance
on the property as of the date of this Memorandum Decision.
All principal, interest and reserve account payments from such
date shall be the sole obligation of Dakal.

All rental payments

from tenants paid in escrow or due shall go to Dakal.
The Rydalches have been unjustly enriched at the expense
of Dakal in the amount of $37,980.00, the sale price of the
property.

The closing costs of the conveyance from the Rydalches

to Dakal shall remain as paid by Dakal.

The $14,000.00 finders

fee paid to Pentelute by Dakal or Peck was not part of the
sale price and any cause of action between Dakal or Peck and
Pentelute is up to those parties, as Pentelute is not a party
to these proceedings.

A Judgment by the Court is therefore

rendered against the Rydalches and in favor of Dakal for $37,980.00.
All rights and/or liabilities of the Rydalches relating to the
property are terminated.
In the opinion of the Court, Liston is the least culpable
of all the parties now before the Court.

His only liability

could arise from his transfer of the property without obtaining
the prior approval of American.

Without ruling on the legal

question of whether Liston may still be liable pursuant to the
terms of American's Non-Assumption Agreement, the Court concludes
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that it would be inequitable for Liston to remain personally
liable in view of the Court's remedy as set forth above.

Therefore,

all rights and/or liabilities of Liston relating to the property
or American's claims against Liston are terminated.
The Court also empathizes with Liston and it is most
unfortunate that he is the apparent victim of a fraud perpetrated
by Roy Miller and/or M & W Enterprises, Herb Holtzer and Shino
Corporation.

However, none of these parties is now before the

Court and Liston must pursue his own cause of action against
any of them.
All of the parties now before the Court bear some responsibility
for the events leading up to these proceedings.

Although only

mentioned briefly by the Court, the unfortunate result of the
entire chain of events would not have occurred except for the
negligent and unilateral mistake of American in releasing its
interest in the property.

It is therefore the judgment of the

Court that each party shall bear its own costs and attorney's
fees and that American is not entitled to any late fees which
have accrued as of the date of this Memorandum Decision.
Counsel for American shall prepare the necessary Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and Order of the Court,
including the precise amounts of all sums due and owing from
one party to another as of the date of this Memorandum Decision,
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Such documents shall be submitted

to the Court and other parties by ,7,ino

?Q

IQP,4

DIVERSIFIED EQUITIES
VS. LISTON, ET AL

PAGE FOURTEEN

MEMORANDUM DECISION

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the
following, this

Jerome H.
Arthur H.
Attorneys
356 South
Salt Lake

^ Q—

day of May, 1984:

Mooney
Strong
for Plaintiffs
300 East
City, Utah 84111

Spencer E. Austin
Attorney at Law
185 South State
Salt Lake City, Utah

84147

David J. Knowlton
Attorney at Law
2910 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84402
Duane A. Burnett
Attorney at Law
P. 0. Box 27
Bountiful, Utah 84010
i/fed Boyer
H. Mifflin Williams, III
Attorneys at Law
200 American Savings Plaza
77 West 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

, ^ ^ ^ ^ s > < ^ ^ cfQO

K l >-<

Ted Boyer
H. Mifflin Williams III
CLYDE, PRATT, GIBBS & CAHOON
Attorneys for Defendant
American Savings & Loan Association
200 American Savings Plaza
77 West Second South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 322-2516

- 'Ao^
cv'
St
i n f ;

Gv~

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DIVERSIFIED EQUITIES, INC., a Utah
corporation, and DAKAL, INC., a
Utah corporation,
Plaintiffs,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
MARK ENGAR LISTON; ROY L. MILLER
and ELLEN GERALDINE MILLER, husband
and wife; BARBARA VIGIL; TIMOTHY
HART and GAYLE HART, husband and
wife; each idividually; and
BENJAMIN P. KNOWLTON, as trustee
and not individually; and AMERICAN
SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, a Utah
banking corporation; BEEHIVE THRIFT
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, a Utah banking corporation; and M & W ENTERPRISES, allegedly a Utah general
partnership; and JOHN DOE NUMBERS 1
through 10 being all other persons
unknown, claiming any right, title,
estate or interest in, or lien upon
the real property described in the
pleading adverse to the Plaintiffs'
ownership, or clouding their title
thereto,
Defendants.
AMERICAN SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION,
RATT.
AHOON
*T LAW
•AVINOS
<D SOUTH
CITY.
lOt

Third-party
Plaintiff,

Case No. C83-2042
Honorable J. Dennis
Frederick, Judge

,?^

vs.
I STEWART TITLE COMPANY and DOUGLAS
| F. RYDALCHf
!

|

Third-party
Defendants.

THIS CAUSE came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable

j
| J. Dennis Frederick, Judge of the above-entitled Court on the 19th
J day of April, 1984, various parties to the action having been pre!viously dismissed therefrom, and the remaining following parties
I being present and/or represented by their respective counsel: For
ithe Plaintiffs, Jerome H. Mooney, Esq.; for Defendant Mark Engar
jListon, David J.

Knowlton, Esq.; for Defendant and Third-party

;Plaintiff American Savings & Loan Association, H. Mifflin Williams
j III, Esq.; for Third-party Defendant Douglas R. Rydalch, Duane A.
i
i

'Burnett, Esq.
The parties represented at the hearing having entered into
and presented an oral stipulation of facts, agreed to by all the
parties so represented, and said parties having introduced their
respective documents which were admitted into evidence, and Defendant Mark Engar Liston having presented evidence, and the Court
having heard and examined the evidence, both oral and documentary,
introduced by the respective parties hereto, and having examined
the memoranda of counsel, and now being fully advised in the premises, makes the following:

PIHDINGS OF PACT
1.
Plaintiff

On or about January 27, 1978, Defendant and Third-party
American

Savings

and

Loan

Association

(hereinafter

"American") made a loan to Donald J, and Karen H. Bailey in the
sum of $59f200f which loan was evidenced by a Promissory Note and
a Deed of Trust.

The Deed of Trust was dated January 27, 1978,

and recorded February 2, 1978, as Entry No. 3059974 at page 826
of Book 4619 in the official

records of the Salt Lake County

Recorder's Office.
2.

The real property (hereinafter ••property") described in

said Deed of Trust is located in Salt Lake County, Utah, and is
more particularly described as follows:
All of Lot 41, TAMLEE VILLAGE, according to the official
plat thereof, recorded in the office of the County
Recorder of Salt Lake County, Utah.
3.

In October,

1980, the Baileys

sold

the property

to

Defendant Mark Engar Liston (sometimes hereinafter "Liston") who
assumed the Baileys1 loan with American upon American's approval
by executing a Mortgage Loan Assumption Agreement, a Modification
Agreement, and a Waiver of Deed of Trust Non-Assumption Agreement,
4.

In the documentation signed by Liston when he assumed

the above-described loan, the Deed of Trust Non-Assumption Agreement was waived specifically and exclusively for the conveyance
from Bailey to Liston, but the Deed of Trust Non-Assuraption Agreement did remain in effect as to subsequent sales.

5.

On May 14, 1982, Liston gave to M & W Enterprises a War-

ranty Deed (which was subsequently recorded) without the approval
or knowledge of American, even though the property was still subject to American's Trust Deed.
6.

On May 28, 1982, without American's knowledge or appro-

val, M & W Enterprises sold the property to Defendant Douglas F.
Rydalch

(sometimes

hereinafter

"Rydalch")

and

his

wife,

Joan

Rydalch (hereinafter referred to with Defendant Douglas F. Rydalch
as "Rydalches").
7.

The

Warranty

Deed

conveying

the

property

from

M & W

Enterprises to the Rydalches, expressly stated that the property
was subject to American's Trust Deed.
8.

The

Buyer's

Escrow

Instructions,

executed

by

the

Rydalches, also expressly stated that the property was subject to
American's

Trust

Deed

and

also

subject

to

the

Deed

of

Trust

Non-Assumption Agreement requiring the written approval of American prior to any sale or transfer of the property.
9.

The Rydalches also executed an Indemnification and Wai-

ver Agreement for Non-Assumption Clause in which they acknowledged
that

Stewart

Title

Company,

the

escrow

and

closing

agent, had

informed them of the existence of American's Non-Assumption Agreement, and that

the Rydalches

Stewart

Title

Company

failure

to obtain

for

written

transfer of the property.

would

any

hold

harmless

consequences

approval

from

and

resulting

American

indemnify
from

prior

the

to the

10.

M & W Enterprises also executed a Transfer and Assign-

ment of Reserve Account which assigned

and transferred

to the

Rydalches all amounts held by American for payment of taxes and
insurance on the property.
11.

Based

upon

an

appraisal

of

the property

Appraisal Associates, the Rydalches received
policy

from Stewart Title Company

by Academy

a title insurance

in the amount of $103,000.

Schedule B of said policy clearly states that the policy, itself,
did not insure against any loss by reason of American's Deed of
Trust and Non-Assumption Agreement.
12.

The closing officer at Stewart Title Company further

indicated that she very carefully explained to the Rydalches that
the property was subject to American's Deed of Trust.
13.
Deed

on

American mistakenly and unilaterally released its Trust
the

property

by

reconveyance

which

was

recorded

on

December 9, 1982, as Entry No. 3737849 in Book 5424, page 1731 in
the records of the County Recorder of Salt Lake County, Utah.
14.

The Trust Deed in favor of American had in fact not been

paid and the reconveyance was erroneously given.

Said Trust Deed

continues to be unpaid.
15.

As of May 30, 1984, the total remaining unpaid principal

balance owed

to American

under

its Trust

Deed

is the sum of

$56,742.92 and the arrearages under said Trust Deed (which total
$15,886.00) consist of principal in the sura of $1,283.60, interest
in the sum of
$1,956.28.

$12,626.12

and

reserve

account

in the

sum of

16.

On February 17, 1983, American recorded its Affidavit as

Entry No. 3760970 in Book 5439 at page 171 in the official records
of the County Recorder of Salt Lake County, Utah, indicating that
the Trust Deed, described hereinabove, had been released by mistake.
/

17.

Consequently, it is clear that the Rydalches either knew

or certainly should have known that their obligation to American
had not been paid since they had not done so and that American's
\

release of its Trust Deed on the property had to be a mistake.
18.
Rydalches

On January
sold

the

21, 1983, for
subject

property

the

sum

of

to Plaintiff

$37,980, the
Dakal, Inc.

(sometimes hereinafter "Dakal") which on the same day, sold the
property to Plaintiff Diversified Equities, Inc. (sometimes hereinafter "Diversified" or "Diversified Equities") for the sum of
$60,000.
19.

Prior to the sale of the property to Dakal, Defendant

Rydalch represented to Dakal that American's interest in the property had been satisfied.
20.

At

the

time of

the

sale

of

the

property

from

the

Rydalches to Dakal, Wayne Peck was the President and principal
executive officer of Dakal and Diversified.
21•

Wayne Peck, insofar as the facts and events regarding

the conveyances of the property from Third-party Defendant Rydalch
to Dakal, Inc., and from Dakal, Inc., to Diversified Equities,
Inc., are concerned, was the "alter ego" of both Dakal and Diversified Equities.

i'

I

J

22.

An individual by the name of Brad Pentelute arranged the

t sale of the property (from the Rydalches to Dakal) in behalf of
{ Dakal and Wayne Peck.
!

23.

Brad Pentelute was clearly acting as the agent of Dakal

»
!

! and Wayne Peek, the President and principal executive officer of
{Diversified and Dakal, Inc., in arranging the sale of the property
!

j from Third-Party Defendant Rydalch to Plaintiff Dakal, Inc.
i

!

24.

Brad Pentelute and/or Wayne Peck had more than suffi-

!

! cient

information

I Rydalch

had

to necessitate a further

actually

satisfied

the

inquiry

obligation

to

into whether
American

and

j whether American had made a mistake in releasing its Trust Deed on
i the property.
!

25.

Such an inquiry would have, in all probability, lead to

j the discovery that while the Rydalches, and no one else, had the
I obligation

to

pay

American's

loan,

neither

the

Rydalches

nor

j

anyone else had paid American and that American's release of its
Trust Deed was, in fact, a mistake.
26.
should

In addition, Brad Pentelute and/or Wayne Peck knew or
have

known

that

Rydalches' representation
property.

Supporting

something
of

facts

their

was

amiss

fee simple

include the

regarding

ownership

the

of the

"distress" sale of the

property by the Rydalches to Dakal for approximately one-half or
j less of its market value, the $14,000 finder's fee paid to Brad
|Pentelute by Wayne Peck compared to the purchase price by Dakal of
t

i $37,980, and the same-day transfer of the property from Dakal to
'Diversified by Wayne Peck for $60,000.

27.

Both

Brad

Pentelute

and

Wayne

Peck

had

substantial

I experience and dealings with distressed properties and real estate
' transactions in general, both were aware of the approximate market
value of the property and Pentelute was aware of American's interest in the property at the time the Rydalches acquired the pro, perty from M & W Enterprises (Pentelute had received a copy of the
title insurance policy for the property received by the Rydalches
at the time of their purchase which showed American's lien).
28.

The property was sold by the Rydalches to Dakal for

approximately one-half or less of its market value.
29.

Wayne Peck paid a finder's fee in the sum of $14,000 to

Brad Pentelute for arranging the property's purchase by Dakal.
30.

Dakal paid the closing costs of the conveyance from the

Rydalches to Dakal.
31.

Dakal is entitled to receive all rental payments in the

• total sum of $325.00 from tenants of the property which have been
. paid in escrow or are currently due.
|

CONCLUSIONS OP LAW

•

1.

Brad Pentelute and/or Wayne Peck had more than suffi-

i

j cient information to necessitate a further inquiry into whether
Rydalch had actually "satisfied" the obligation to American and
whether American had made a mistake in releasing its Trust Deed on
the property.
I

2.

Such an inquiry would havef in all probability, lead to

\ the discovery that while the Rydalches, and no one else, had the
obligation to pay American's loanr neither the Rydalches nor anyone else had paid American and that American's release of its
LYDE. PRATT,
SBS ft C A H O O N
row*i*Y» AT L A W
MIKftlCAN AAV IN a *

Trust Deed was in fact a mistake.

i
i

;

3.

«

:

In addition,

and/or Wayne Peck

the

Court

concludes

that

Brad

knew or should have known that

Pentelute

something

was

; amiss regarding the Rydalches representation of their fee simple
ownership of the property.

Supporting

facts

include

the

•dis-

tress" sale of the property by the Rydalches to Dakal for approximately one-half or less of its market valuef the $14,000 finder's
fee paid to Brad Pentelute by Wayne Peck compared to the purchase
price

by

Dakal

of

$37,980,

and

the

same-day

transfer

of

the

property from Dakal to Diversified by Wayne Peck for $60,000.
4.

Brad Pentelute

and Wayne Peck had

"actual

notice" of

• American's security interest in the property which was mistakenly
released by American prior to the conveyance of the property from
Rydalch to Dakal and from Dakal to Diversified.
5.

Brad Pentelute was clearly acting as the agent of Dakal

and Wayne Peck, the President

and principal executive officer of

; Diversified and Dakal, Inc., in arranging the sale of the property
| from Third-party Defendant Rydalch to Plaintiff Dakal, Inc.
i
I

6.

Wayne Peck, insofar as the facts and

events

regarding

the conveyances of the property from Third-party Defendant Rydalch
to Dakal, Inc., and

from Dakal, Inc., to Diversified

Equities,

Inc., are concerned, was the "alter ego" of both Dakal and Diversified Equities.
!
7.
The actual notice of both Brad Pentelute and Wayne Peck
1

are imputed to both Dakal and Diversified

Equities
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Arthur H.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
p

DIVERSIFIED EQUITIES, INC., a Utah
corporation, and DAKAL, INC., a
Utah corporation,
Plaint iffs,

MARK ENGAR LISTON; ROY L. MILLER
and ELLEN GERALDINE MILLER, husband
and wife; BARBARA VIGIL; TIMOTHY
HART and GAYLE HART, husband and
wife; each idividually; and
BENJAMIN P. KNOWLTON, as trustee
and not individually; and AMERICAN
SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, a Utah
banking corporation; BEEHIVE THRIFT
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, a Utah banking corporation; and M & W ENTERPRISES, allegedly a Utah general
partnership; and JOHN DOE"NUMBERS 1
through 10 being all other persons
unknown, claiming any right, title,
estate or interest in, or lien upon
the real property described in the
pleading adverse to the Plaintiffs 1
ownership, or c1oud ing the ir title
thereto,

JUDGMEN

Third-party
Plaintiff,

SAVINGS

PLAZA

UTAH M t O I

r-.

AND ORDER

Honorable J. Dennis
Frederick,, Judge

77 WEST S r C O N D SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY.

f

Case No. C83-204:

A T T O R N E Y S AT L A W
2 0 0 AMERICAN

/V /

? JL

AMERICAN1 SAVING:, i LOAN ASSOC IA TTON.

C L Y D E . PRATT.
GSBBS 8c C A H O O N

f

Ex. ^x

vs.
STEWART TITLE COMPANY and DOUGLAS
F. RYDALCH,
Third-party
Defendants.

THIS CAUSE came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable
J. Dennis Frederick, Judge of the above-entitled Court on the 19th
day of April, 1984, various parties to the action having been previously dismissed

therefrom, and the remaining

following

parties

being present and/or represented by their respective counsel:

For

the Plaintiffs, Jerome H. Mooney, Esq.; for Defendant Mark Engar
Liston, David J.

Knowlton,

Esq.;

for

Defendant

and

Third-party

Plaintiff American Savings & Loan Association, H. Mifflin Williams
III, Esq.; for Third-party Defendant Douglas F. Rydalch, Duane A.
Burnett, Esq.
The parties represented

at the hearing

having

entered

into

and presented an oral stipulation of facts, agreed to by all the
parties so represented, and said parties having

introduced

their

respective documents which were admitted into evidence, and Defendant Mark Engar Liston having presented

evidence, and the Court

having heard and examined the evidence, both oral and documentary,
introduced by the respective parties hereto, and having examined
the memoranda of counsel, and now being fully advised in the premises, and having made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,

NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.
property

That

all

transactions

(hereinafter

regarding

"property") situated

the

transfer

of

real

in the County of Salt

Lake, State of Utah, and more particularly described

hereinbelow

from Plaintiff, Dakal, Inc., to Plaintiff, Diversified Equities,
Inc., are rescinded, and all rights and/or liabilities of Plaintiff, Diversified

Equities, Inc., to the property

Dakal, Inc., respectively, are terminated.

or

Plaintiff

The property

is more

particularly described as follows:
LOT 41, TAMLEE VILLAGE, ACCORDING TO THE OFFICIAL PLAT THEREOF, recorded in the office of
the Salt Lake County Recorder located in Salt
Lake County, Utah.
2.

Pursuant

to its original

trust deed

dated January 27,

1978, and recorded as Entry No. 3059974 at page 826 in Book 4619
of the official records of the Salt Lake County Recorder

in Salt

Lake County, Utah, Defendant, American Savings & Loan Association
is

the holder

of

an

equitable

lien

upon

the

property

for

the

amount of unpaid principal and arrearages due and owing and upon
precisely the same payment terms as Defendant American Savings &
Loan's original trust deed
all other terms of said

(as set forth

trust deed

with

in this paragraph) and
the specific

exception

that the sole obligor or trustor of Defendant American Savings &
Loan's security interest shall be Plaintiff, Dakal, Inc.
3.

That Plaintiff, Dakal, Inc., owns in fee simple the real

property situated in the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, and

described hereinabove, subject

to an equitable

Defendant American Savings & Loan Association

lien in favor of
for the amount of

unpaid principal and arrearages due and owing and upon precisely
the same payment

terms

of

principal

and

interest

American Savings & Loanfs original trust deed

as

Defendant

(dated January 27,

1978, and recorded February 2, 1978, as Entry No. 3059974 at page
826 in Book 4619, of the official records of the Salt Lake County
Recorder) and all other terms of said trust deed with the specific
exception that the sole obligor or trustor of Defendant American
Savings & Loan Association's security interest shall be Plaintiff
Dakal, Inc.
4.
balance

As of May 30, 1984, the total remaining unpaid principal
owed

to Defendant

American

Savings

& Loan

under its equitable lien was the sum of $56,742.92.

Association
The arrear-

ages under said equitable lien consist of principal in the sum of
t

? 1 .?ai.fio

interest

in the sum of

$ i ? r^

^9

, and

account (for taxes and insurance) in the sum of $ 1,956.28
5.

reserve
L

That Plaintiff, Dakal, Inc., shall have six months from

May 30, 1984, to bring current all arrearages f6r monthly payments
and the reserve account.
6.

Defendant American Savings & Loan Association shall not

be entitled

to any late

fees which

have accrued

as of May 30,

1984.
7.

From May 30, 1984, all principal, interest and reserve

account payments to Defendant American Savings & Loan Association

under its equitable lien shall be the sole obligation of Plaintiff
Dakal, Inc.
All renta1

8.

payments

paid

by tenants

of

the property

which have been paid in escrow or which are currently due in the
sum of $325.00 shall be paid to Dakal, Inc.
9.

Third-party

Defendant

Douglas

F.

Rydalch

has

been

unjustly enriched at the expense of Plaintiff Dakal, Inc., in the
amount

of

$37,980

and

judgment

is

hereoy

rendered

against

Third-party Defendant Douglas Rydalch and in favor of Plaintiff
Dekal, Inc., for $37,980.
10.

That all rights and/or liabilities of Third-party Defen-

dant Douglas F„ Rydalch relating to the property are hereby terminated.
11.

That

Third-party

the closing

Defendart

costs

Rydalch

of

the

to Plaintiff

conveyance
Dakal,

from

the

Inc., shall

remain as heretofore paid by Plaintiff Dakal, Inc.
12.

All rights and/or

liabilities of Defendant Mark Engar

Liston relating to the property are terminated and the claims of
Defendant American Savings & Loan Association against

Defendant

Liston as set forth in Defendant American Savings fc Loan Association's Counter Claim against said Defendant are hereby dismissed
with prejudice.
13.

Each party shall bear its own costs and attorneys fees

incurred herein.

JL

DATED t h i s

C L Y D E PRATT
G I B S S ft C A H O O N
A T T O R N E Y * AT L A W
2 0 O AMER C A N SAV N O S

PLAZA
77 WWT 6CCONO SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY
UTAH »4IO!

ATTEST
HXDIXONHINDLEY
1

^NCfcr*

Deputy Clerk

day of

CERTIFICATE OP SERVICE
I hereby certify that I personally delivered
rect

copy

of

the

foregoing

Judgment

and

Order

a true and corto

the

offices

of the following counsel this 20th day of June, 1984:
Jerome H.
Arthur H.
Attorneys
356 South
Salt Lake

Mooney, Esq.
Strong, Esq.
for Plaintiffs
300 East
City, UT 84111

Spencer E. Austin, Esq.
Attorney at Law
185 South State Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84147

I hereby certify

that on June

20, 1984, I personally

hand

delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment and
Order to the offices of the following counsel:

David J. Knowlton, Esq.
Attorney at Law
2910 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, UT 84402
Duane A. Burnett, Esq.
710 West 2125 South
Woods Cross, Utah 84087

DIVERSIFIED EQUITIES v. AMER. SAV. & LOAN

Utah

H33

Cite M 739 ?J26 1133 (UtahApp. 1987)

tion. Ru^e 19 ( a ) instructs the trial
rt to join as a party a person whose
00
c e will prevent complete relief among
* e already parties. A plain reading of
les l?(a) a n ^ ^(a) r e v e a ^ s t n a t t n e t r ^
rt should make every effort to insure
°h t the proceeding adjudicates the rights
/ those necessary and intended to be be°t pp the court. In conjunction with this
•c concept is the requirement in Utah
wn cn sta
R CJV.P. ^ ^
*
tes t n a t leave shall
' freely given to amend a pleading when
• stice so requires. This admonition is givn in the sentence which declares that subequent amendments to pleadings may be
made only by leave of court or by written
consent of the adverse party.
[2] Defendant cannot claim that it was
not aware of plaintiffs status as a partnership as early as nine months prior to the
o^al. During the taking of depositions in
August of 1983, defendant's counsel was
informed that plaintiff was a partnership.
Plaintiffs status was also revealed to defendant both by the Stipulation and Order
at the
to Amend mailed to counsel and
pre-trial settlement conference.1

for the court to dismiss with prejudice
and prevent future consideration of the
claims should the defect be corrected.
The trial court abused its discretion by
entering its Rule 41(b) dismissal with
prejudice.
Id. at 1020.
[3] In this case we believe the court
abused its discretion in not allowing the
amendment or granting a continuance.
Defendant claimed no surprise, nor could
it, but instead relied on the specter of increased costs and complexity if the amendment was granted. Despite the parties being represented by the same counsel
throughout the proceedings and despite
there being no surprise, the dismissal with
prejudice was granted. While courts are
given great latitude and discretion in the
application of the law, they still must have
sufficient grounds to apply the "harsh and
permanent remedy" of a dismissal with
prejudice. No such grounds appear here.
The dismissal with prejudice and the
judgment are reversed and the case is remanded for trial.

The issue of dismissing an action with
GREENWOOD and JACKSON, JJ.,
prejudice was recently addressed by the concur.
Utah Supreme Court in Bonneville Tower
v. Thompson Michie Assoc, 728 P.2d 1017
| KEY NUMBER SYSTEM
(Utah 1986). The trial court's dismissal for
3>
failure to join indispensable parties was
affirmed but the Supreme Court remanded
with the instruction to enter the dismissal
without prejudice. That Court wrote:
DIVERSIFIED EQUITIES, INC., a Utah
While the court below properly exercised
corporation, and Dakal, Inc., a Utah
its discretion in dismissing plaintiffs accorporation, Plaintiffs and Appellants,
tion for failing to comply with Rule 19(a),
v.
it was improper to do so with prejudice.
AMERICAN SAVINGS AND LOAN
Dismissal with prejudice under Rule
ASSOCIATION, et al., Defendant
41(b) is a harsh and permanent remedy
and Respondent.
when it precludes a presentation of a
plaintiffs claims on their merits. Our
No. 860287-CA.
niles of procedure are intended to enCourt
of Appeals of Utah.
courage the adjudication of disputes on
their merits.
July 22, 1987.
N

°t having considered the merits of
Plaintiffs claims, there was no reason

Action was brought to quiet title to
property. The District Court, Salt Lake

At trial, counsel for defendant admitted re^ n g the request to stipulate to the filing of

the Second Amended Complaint but stated that
he was unwilling to so stipulate.
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County, J. Dennis Frederick, J., quieted
title in subsequent purchasers subject to
equitable lien in favor of holder of trust
deed. Appeal was taken. The Court of
Appeals, Orme, J., held that unrecorded
conveyance was void as against subsequent
purchasers.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.
1. Vendor and Purchaser <£=*229(2)
For unrecorded conveyance to be void
as against any subsequent purchaser in
good faith and for valuable consideration,
subsequent purchaser must show he had no
actual notice, i.e., no personal knowledge of
prior conveyance or that prior conveyance
did not impart constructive notice or that
prior conveyance was not recorded before
his conveyance in same land was recorded.
U.C.A.1953, 57-1-6, 57-3-3.
2. Vendor and Purchaser <3=*229(2)
If a subsequent purchaser has information or facts which would put prudent
person upon inquiry which, if pursued,
would lead to actual knowledge as to state
of title, unrecorded conveyance is not void
as against subsequent purchaser. U.C.A.
1953, 57-1-6, 57-3-3.
3. Vendor and Purchaser <s=>229(2)
Unrecorded conveyance was void as
against subsequent purchasers, although
mortgage broker and principal of subsequent purchasers had sufficient information to necessitate further inquiry on status
of trust deed; broker and principal acted
with sufficient diligence to meet duty imposed by doctrine of inquiry notice by having title search performed and personally
contacting trust deed holder which mistakenly stated that loan was paid off. U.C.A.
1953, 57-1-6, 57-3-3.

Jerome H. Mooney, Arthur M. Strong,
Mooney & Smith, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and appellants.
Ted Boyer, H. Mifflin Williams III,
Clyde, Pratt, Gibbs & Cahoon, Salt Lake
City, for defendant and respondent.

Before ORME, JACKSON and
BENCH, JJ.
OPINION
ORME, Judge:
Appellants Diversified Equities I
versified) and Dakal, Inc. (Dakal) K
an action to quiet title to a duplex a U^1
in Salt Lake County. Respondent A
can Savings and Loan (American) hj^
recorded security interest in the pro *
which was released prior to the conve ^
es to Diversified and Dakal. The 1 *
court quieted title in Dakal, subject to ^
equitable lien in favor of American equal^
the principal amount owing on the n
secured by American's previous trust deed
Dakal seeks reversal of the lower court/
judgment and an order that Dakal owm
the property in fee simple, free of any
interest in American. Diversified, which
bought the property from Dakal, seeks reversal of the judgment below and an order
upholding its rights against Dakal in the
property. We reverse.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
So far as is relevant for this appet],
which concerns only the rights of Dakal/Diversified and American inter se, the
dispute was submitted to the lower court
on a detailed stipulation of facts read into
the record by counsel. Although there are
several transactions, the key facts are relatively simple.
On January 2, 1978, American loaned the
Baileys $59,200, which was secured by i
trust deed to the property in question. The
trust deed was recorded in February 1978.
The property was then sold in 1980 to
Liston, then on May 14, 1982 by Liston to
M & W Enterprises. Although M & W did
not pay cash, Liston parted with title to the
property. M & W's future obligation*
were not secured by the subject property
but instead Liston was given a trust deed
in other property, which proved to be
worthless as security. M & W sold the
subject property to Rydalch on May &
1982, as the first part of a contempt
exchange transaction. The property **
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bject to American's original trust
\A "and the deed to Rydalch so recited, as
^various closing papers.
order to purchase the property from
ln
yf Rydalch borrowed $18,000 from
who took in return a note for $19,\I & W's principal, Miller, promised
pay Holzer within 30 days. Instead,
to l skipped town. Rydalch then atrr
Milte
"oted to sell the property to raise the
ev to repay the note to Holzer and had
m
° attorney, Burnett, investigate the liens
the property. Burnett learned from an°ther financial institution that its trust
0
A 0f record had actually been discharged and he secured a reconveyance.
Rydalch and Burnett then called American
total of three times and, while the first
call was inconclusive, were told each of the
other times that the loan to the Baileys had
been repaid. Rydalch apparently chose not
w be too curious about who his benefactor
might be.
Prompted by the telephone calls, American executed and recorded a reconveyance
in early December 1982. American subsequently discovered that the loan had not
been paid and that there was a balance due
in excess of $55,000. Apparently American
erred because the Baileys had some thirtyfour loans with American, and American's
records were somewhat confused. The trial court concluded that American was negligent in reconveying the property.1
S

Meanwhile, Holzer began threatening
Rydalch that he and his family would sustain bodily harm if the amount due him was
not paid. Although Holzer had received a
trust deed to the duplex property, he wanted cash. Rydalch then responded to an ad
placed by Pentelute, a self-described mortgage broker specializing in distressed
**les. Pentelute spoke to Rydalch, Rydalch's attorney Burnett, and American,
*nd received confirmation all around that
I. The reconveyance gives every appearance of
<*ing the product of a deliberate—and delibera|«*-*ct The "Full Reconveyance" was signed
*y one officer and attested by another. It recited that written instructions to reconvey had
«*n received from the beneficiarv anrl tK„ *unote secured by the trust deed had been ore t
ed for endorsement. It additionally recttedTh

American's trust deed had been satisfied.
Pentelute was furnished a copy of the reconveyance. Pentelute then contacted
Wayne Peck, a principal in both Dakal and
Diversified, who agreed to purchase the
property. Pentelute ordered a title search,
which disclosed nothing unexpected except
a lis pendens recorded in September 1982
on behalf of Liston. To facilitate the sale
which would raise his repayment, on January 21, 1983, Holzer obtained a release of
the lis pendens, albeit with a bad check,
and the sale from Rydalch to Dakal was
closed later that day.
Dakal paid $38,260 for the property and
paid Pentelute a $14,000 finder's fee. Dakal immediately recorded its warranty deed
and sold the property to Diversified for
$60,000. A month later American, having
discovered its mistake, recorded an affidavit stating that it had released the trust
deed in error and that the trust deed was
still in effect.
On these facts,2 the trial court held that
Diversified and Dakal were not bona fide
purchasers of the property. It concluded
that Pentelute and/or Wayne Peck had
more than sufficient information to necessitate yet further inquiry into whether Rydalch or any one else had actually satisfied
the obligation to American and whether
American had made a mistake in releasing
its trust deed on the property. The trial
court cited the following facts as imposing
upon Pentelute and Peck a duty of further
inquiry: the reference to American's lien in
Rydalch's deed; the sale of the property by
Rydalch to Dakal for approximately onehalf or less of its market value; the $14,000 finder's fee paid to Pentelute compared
to the purchase price of some $38,000; and
the same-day transfer of the property from
Dakal to Diversified. The trial court quieted title in Dakal, subject to an equitable
lien in favor of American.
the reconveyance was executed by authority of a
resolution of American's board of directors.
2. Significantly, the stipulated facts include nothing inconsistent with the conclusion that the
dealings of Rydalch and Dakal, through the broker Pentelute, were at arm's length.
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The issue on appeal is whether there was
sufficient notice of a "lien" on the property
to require a duty of further inquiry by
Dakal. If there was, Dakal was not a bona
fide purchaser and took the property subject to American's "lien." 3
NOTICE REQUIREMENT
[1] Under our recording statute, an
unrecorded conveyance is "void as against
any subsequent purchaser in good faith
and for valuable consideration of the same
real estate . . . where his own conveyance
shall be first duly recorded." Utah Code
Ann. § 57-3-3 (1986). However, under
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-6 (1986), unrecorded documents affecting real property are
enforceable as against persons with "actual
notice." Thus, "[a] subsequent purchaser
must . . . show that he had no actual notice,
i.e., no personal knowledge, of a prior conveyance or that the prior conveyance did
not impart constructive notice, i.e., was not
recorded before his conveyance in the same
land was recorded." Utah Farm Prod.
Credit Ass'n. v. Wasatch Bank, 734 P.2d
904, 906 n. 2 (Utah 1987). Wayne Peck and
Pentelute obviously did not have constructive or record notice because American had
mistakenly released its trust deed and recorded its reconveyance before they dealt
with the property.
[2] As for the "actual notice" exception
of Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-6 (1986), the
stipulated facts make clear Peck and Pentelute did not have actual knowledge of
American's interest. However, the exception is also triggered if a party dealing with
the land has information or facts which
would put a prudent person upon an inquiry which, if pursued, would lead to actual knowledge as to the state of the title.
Johnson v. Bell, 666 P.2d 308, 310 (Utah
3. For purposes of this appeal, we employ the
parties' logic that the legal effect of an improvidently recorded reconveyance is to leave the
lien created by the trust deed in legal existence,
albeit unrecorded. We are not asked to decide
whether reconveyance has the legal effect of
actually terminating the lien created by a trust
deed and rendering the accompanying note, if it
has not been repaid, unsecured.

1983). Whether a party should be Cn
with "actual notice," either in the sen ^
having actual knowledge or being" A °*
quiry notice, turns on questions of f
See id. The trial court "found" that P ^
and Pentelute were chargeable with "
al notice."
EFFECT OF STIPULATED FACTS
Generally, a trial court's findings of f
are accorded great deference. Howev
without regard to the labels used, wh '
those "findings" proceed from stipulated
facts, as in the instant case, the "finding"
are tantamount to conclusions of law with
the stipulation of facts being the functional
equivalent of true findings of fact. Se
Stiles v. Brown, 380 So.2d 792, 794 (Ala
1980). See also City of Spencer v. Hawkeye Security Ins. Co., 2Yt) ^.^.Sa 406,408
(Iowa 1974) ("Where the facts are not in
material dispute, interpretation placed
thereon by trial court becomes a question
of law which is not conclusive on appeal.")Schroeder v. Horack, 592 S.W.2d 742, 744
(Mo. 1979) (only issue on appeal was whether trial court drew the proper legal conclusions from the stipulated facts). On appeal, this court reviews conclusions of law
for legal correctness. Copper State Thrift
& Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah
App.1987). See Scharfv. BMG Corp., 700
P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).
CONCLUSION
[3] After a careful review of the stipulated facts, we cannot agree with the lower
court's conclusion of law that Pentelute
and Peck (as opposed to Rydalch, who
clearly lenew better) had sufficient mlormation to necessitate further inquiry into the
status of American's trust deed.4
4. The previously identified specific factors relied on by the court in support of its conclusion
that Pentelute and Peck were not bona fide
purchasers do not tilt toward that result. Refaence in Rydalch's deed to American's interest
was meaningless in the face of American's subsequent reconveyance. A distress sale well below market price can be prompted by numerous
factors. Indeed, it was stated in the stipulauoo
of facts that Rydalch would testify he agreed w
sell so cheaply because he could not secure 1
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\\Thile the circumstances were suspicious
called for inquiry, Pentelute, acting for
peck, inquired—and with sufficient dil. enC e to meet the duty imposed by the
doctrine of inquiry notice. He had a title
search performed and he personally contacted American even though the results of
jtydalch's and Burnett's three prior contacts were accurately—if disingenuously—
communicated to him and even though he
had a copy of the reconveyance. American
confirmed what the title search, the reconveyance, Burnett, and Rydalch all told him.
Wayne Peck, acting for Dakal and Diversified, reasonably relied on the title search
and the clear evidence, both documentary
and verbal, of American's reconveyance.5
American negligently released its trust
deed, and its security interest will not be
preserved against bona fide third party
purchasers who, at least on the facts as
an d

loan since the duplex was not owner-occupied
and because of the lis pendens against the property. In addition, it was actually stipulated that
Rydalch was under extreme pressure because of
Hoizer's threats of violence and because of the
imminency of a trustee's sale noticed by Holzer.
A hefty finder's fee is to be expected where a
free-lance broker finds a property which can be
had for a comparative song. A same-day transfer from one related entity to another might be
effected for a number of tax or business reasons. In this case, Diversified was a group of
investors put together by Peck but who, unlike
Peck, apparently had no interest in Dakal. The
back-to-back sales left the Diversified shareholders with a property worth more than they had to
pay for it, while netting Dakal, in which Peck
apparently had a greater interest, $8,000.00
profit.
5. A duty of inquiry requires the party to make
inquiry and to diligently do that which the an-

stipulated, were bona fide purchasers without notice and without further duty to inquire. To hold otherwise would defeat the
purpose of the recording statutes and subvert the sound commercial policy they promote.
We reverse and remand with instructions
to quiet title to Dakal and/or Diversified,
as their interests may appear, as against
American. Each party shall bear its own
costs of appeal.
JACKSON and BENCH, JJ., concur.
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swer to the inquiry reasonably prompts. Pentelute's inquiry elicited an answer which was consistent with the reconveyance document he had
seen, the title report, and Rydalch's and Burnett's reports about what they were told. It
would stretch the notion of inquiry notice beyond the breaking point to hold that the answer
Pentelute received to his inquiry of American
should have prompted him to go further. What
would he have done? Demand to see receipts,
instructions for reconveyance from the beneficiary to the trustee, or the chairman of American's board? He obviously had some concern
or, with a reconveyance regular on its face in
hand, there would be no reason to call American for verbal confirmation of the fact of reconveyance. But a duty to inquire is not a duty to
disbelieve, aggressively investigate, and set
straight. See also Note 1, supra.

